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Abstract
This paper attempts to cast light to the relationship between Cournot-Bertrand
controversy and monopoly regulation. To this purpose, we use a simple model of a
vertically linked market, where an upstream regulated natural monopoly is trading via
two-part tari¤ contracts with a downstream duopoly. Combining our results to those
of the existing literature on deregulated markets, we argue that when the downstream
competition is in prices, e¢ ciency dictates regulating the monopoly with a marginal
cost based pricing scheme. However, this type of regulation leads to signicant welfare
loss, when the downstream market is characterized by Cournot competition.
JEL classication: L43; L51
Keywords: Bertrand; Cournot; Marginal cost pricing; Regulation; Vertical relations
1 Introduction
Utilities such as energy, water supply and telecommunications and certain modes of transport
such as rail, all include natural monopoly characteristics (i.e., electricity transmission, gas
distribution, local loop telecommunications, etc.) arising from pervasive economies of scale
and scope (Armstrong & Sappington, 2006). These characteristics mean that competition
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is unlikely to develop, or if it develops, it will be uneconomic because of the duplication
of assets. As explained by Borenstein (2002), Mulligan and Tsui (2008), Acemoglu and
Robinson (2013) inter alia, in order to prevent this result, the standard approach of policy
making from governments is to develop strong regulatory capabilities so that they can police
the revenues and costs of production of the privatized utility rms and protect consumers
from monopoly exploitation. At the same time, there needs to be commitment on the part
of government to the regulatory rules to establish credibility on the part of the investors that
the regulatory rules will bring about the intended outcome. Where regulatory credibility is
weak or absent, private investment decisions will be adversely a¤ected.
While there is an extensive literature examining the Cournot-Bertrand controversy in
the context of vertically linked markets where trading occurs through linear or non-linear
wholesale prices contracts (Correa-López & Naylor, 2004; Correa-López, 2007; Arya et al.,
2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012; Chirco & Scrimitore, 2013; Alipranti et al., 2014; Manasakis
& Vlassis, 2014), the interdependency between the nature of the downstream competition
and the upstream monopoly regulation is usually ignored by the existing literature. More
specically, Yanez (2002), investigates the spillover e¤ects from price regulation of a single
product that is a substitute in consumption and vertically related to the product of another
regulated industry such as electricity. Armstrong and Sappington (2006) study the choice
between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition, highlighting the role of imperfect
information. They argue that the appropriate choice between the two regimes is strongly af-
fected by certain technological and demand characteristics such as the regulators resources,
the e¢ ciency of tax systems and capital markets, and the strength of other prevailing in-
stitutions. Moreover, Sappington (2006) argues that when vertically integrated providers
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are present (i.e., telecommunications industry) the entrants decision to make or buy critical
production inputs may be largely insensitive to the price of these inputs. Lastly, Bergantino
et al. (2011), explore the e¤ectiveness of price and quality cap regulation where a (regu-
lated) incumbent competes with his (unregulated) rivals under two regimes accounting for
the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg framework respectively.
In this paper, we study the role of downstream competition in a regulated upstream nat-
ural monopoly. A novel aspect of our analysis is that we allow for a two-part tari¤marginal
cost based pricing scheme and we consider the role of its nature, when the monopoly is regu-
lated or deregulated. One additional key aspect of our analysis is that we take into account
downstream competition and its intensity (Cournot or Bertrand). We address a number of
research questions such as: Is it preferable to regulate upstream natural monopolies (utili-
ties), with a two-part tari¤ marginal cost based pricing scheme? Does upstream regulation
stimulate total welfare? What is the role of the nature of downstream competition? We show
that the answer to all these research questions depends solely on the type of downstream
competition. If downstream rivals compete in quantities, then regulation is not preferred
from the viewpoint of welfare when a two-part tari¤ is charged by the monopolist (this is
the usual pricing scheme in utility companies - see for example Joskow, 2014; Viscusi et al.
2005; Newbery, 2002; Brown & Sibley, 1986). However, when the downstream market is
characterized by price competition, marginal cost pricing is the ideal choice.
Our result has important policy implications for a number of markets with natural
monopoly characteristics such as gas and electricity markets. Specically, gas market is
divided into ve relevant market segments: a) the extraction/production of gas (i.e., up-
stream market), b) the transportation of gas via high pressure pipelines (i.e., transmission
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market), c) the transportation on medium and low pressure pipelines (i.e., distribution mar-
ket), and nally, d) the storage of gas and e) the supply of gas to customers (i.e., downstream
market).1 In an empirical study, Davis and Muehlegger (2010), showed that in the market of
the US natural gas distribution, which has natural monopoly characteristics with high xed
and low marginal costs (Newbery, 2002; Davis & Muehlegger, 2010), the ideal regulatory
pricing of a marginal cost-based two-part tari¤ holds only for industrial customers. On the
other hand, residential and commercial customers pay per-unit prices higher than the mar-
ginal cost alongside with a xed monthly fee. According to Davis and Muehlegger (2010) this
pricing policy leads to a huge welfare loss. Given the fact that industrial customers of nat-
ural gas (e.g. reneries, electricity generation, steel industry, cement industry, car industry,
etc.) operate in markets characterized by quantity competition due to capacity constraints
(Cabral, 2000; Motta, 2004), whereas commercial and residential customers mostly, compete,
in prices, our results indicate that regulation is imposed to the wrong market segment. In
other words, the price charged to commercial customers should be regulated with a marginal
cost pricing rule, whereas the charges of industrial customers should be deregulated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The model and the equilibrium analysis
under regulated and deregulated monopoly are presented in the next two sections. Sec-
tion 4 compares the results and discusses the policy implications. A robustness analysis is
conducted in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
1It is worth mentioning that the gas supply market can be further divided into several sub-segments:
i) supply of gas to dealers (including the local distribution companies), ii) supply of gas to gas-powered
electricity plants, iii) supply of gas to large industrial customers, iv) supply of gas to small industrial and
commercial customers, and v) supply of gas to household customers (Fafaliou & Polemis, 2009).
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2 The model
Our setting follows that of Alipranti et al. (2014). We consider a vertically linked market with
an upstream monopoly U , and two downstream rms D1 and D2. Monopolists production
is used as input by downstream rms in one-to-one proportion. The cost of buying this
input is the only cost faced by the downstream rms. The marginal cost of the upstream
monopolist is constant and equals c > 0.
Firms play a two-stage game. In stage one, the upstream monopoly bargains simultane-
ously and separately with its downstream clients over the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract
consisting of a xed tari¤ F and a per unit charge w (wholesale price). The bargaining
between U and Dis (with i = 1; 2) follows the standard Nash bargaining model. In stage
two, the downstream rms compete in quantities (Cournot competition) or prices (Bertrand
competition) after observing each others contract terms (i.e., w and F ) from the rst stage.
In the above-described environment, multiple equilibria can arise due to the multiplicity of
the beliefs that the downstream rms can form when they receive out-of-equilibrium o¤ers
(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). We avoid this problem by assuming immunity of the contract
between U and Di to a bilateral deviation of U with Dj, holding the contract with Di con-
stant (see Horn &Wolinsky, 1988; Cremer & Riordan, 1987; OBrien & Sha¤er, 1992; Milliou
& Petrakis, 2007; Milliou & Pavlou, 2013; Alipranti et al., 2014). In order to guarantee the
existence of a pure strategy pairwise proof equilibrium we make the following assumption:
 > ()  3
(2 )(2 2) , where  2 (0; 1] is the bargaining power of the upstream rm and
 2 (0; 1) is the rate of substitution between the products of the downstream rms.
Following Singh and Vives (1984) the inverse and the direct demand functions for down-
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stream rm i are:
pi = a  qi   qj (1)
qi =
a  pi   (a  pj)
1  2 (2)
where i; j = 1; 2 (with i 6= j), a is a positive constant, pi and qi are the price and quantity
of Di, respectively. Finally, we assume that a > c.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section we examine the equilibrium conditions under two di¤erent regimes: a) when
the upstream monopoly is regulated via a two-part tari¤ where the wholesale price is xed
to marginal cost and b) when the upstream monopolist trades with its downstream rivals
for both the wholesale price and the xed tari¤.
3.1 Regulated monopoly
We assume that the regulator imposes marginal cost pricing on the upstream monopoly.
In this case, the equilibrium wholesale prices under both downstream Cournot (wCi ) and
Bertrand competition (wBi ) will be equal to w
C
1 = w
C
2 = w
B
1 = w
B
2 = w
 = c.
It can be easily shown that the equilibrium output and price under the two di¤erent
modes of downstream competition2 are:
2Where the superscripts C and B denote Cournot and Bertrand downstream competition, respectively.
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qCi =
a  c
2 + 
(3)
pCi =
a+ c(1 + )
2 + 
(4)
qBi =
a  c
(1 + )(2  ) (5)
pBi =
a(1  ) + c
2   (6)
The equilibrium downstream and upstream prots for each mode M = C;B of down-
stream competition are:
CDi = [q
C
i ]
2   FCi (7)
CU = 2(w
   c)qCi + FCi + FCj = FCi + FCj (8)
BDi = (p
B
i   c)qBi   FBi (9)
BU = 2(w
   c)qBi + FBi + FBj = FBi + FBj (10)
The equilibrium xed fee FMi , solves the following Nash product:
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FMi = argmax
Fi
[MU (Fi; F
M
j )  d(FMj )][MDi(Fi)]1  (11)
where d(FMj ) = (w
  c)qmonj +FMj = FMj , qmonj is the downstream monopoly quantity
(disagreement point for U . It is the case where an agreement is not reached between U and
downstream rm i and thus downstream rm j becomes a monopoly).
Solving (11), we get the equilibrium value of the xed fee for each mode of downstream
competition.
FCi =
(a  c)2
(2 + )2
(12)
FBi =
(a  c)2(1  )
(2  )2(1 + ) (13)
Using (3), (5), (6), (12), (13) and (7)-(9), we obtain the equilibrium upstream and down-
stream prots:
CDi =
(1  )(a  c)2
(2 + )2
(14)
CU =
2(a  c)2
(2 + )2
(15)
BDi =
(1  )(1  )(a  c)2
(2  )2(1 + ) (16)
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BU =
2(1  )(a  c)2
(2  )2(1 + ) (17)
From (14)-(17), we note that the industrys prots are divided between the upstream
monopoly and the downstream rms according to the relative bargaining power of each side.
Comparing the above results, we end up to the following Propositions:
Proposition 1. Under regulated upstream market, the nal prices are higher (lower) under
Cournot (Bertrand) competition while the opposite holds for the equilibrium output.
Proof. Taking the di¤erence pC  pB = (a c)2
(2+)(2 ) > 0. Similarly, q
C  qB =  (a c)2
(2+)(1+)(2 ) <
0
Proposition 2. Under regulated upstream market, the equilibrium downstream and upstream
prots are higher (lower) under Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
Proof. The di¤erence between the downstream prots is CDi   BDi = 2(1 )(a c)
23
(2+)2(1+)(2 )2 > 0.
In the case of the upstream market, we have CU   BU = 4(a c)
23
(2+)2(1+)(2 )2 > 0
Proposition 3. Under regulated upstream market, consumerssurplus and total welfare are
lower (higher) under Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
Proof. Consumerssurplus is given by CSM = (1 + )[qMi ]
2 while total welfare is equal to
TWM = CSM + MU + 2
M
Di
.3 Given that qC  qB < 0 it follows that CSC < CSB.
Moreover, TWC   TWB = (2+2 4)(a c)22
(2+)2(1+)(2 )2 < 0
3Total welfare is usually expressed as a weighted sum of consumerssurplus and rmsprots (see for
example Cowan (2001)), i.e., TW = CS + b  , where TW denotes total welfare, CS denotes consumers
surplus,  denotes rmsprots and 0 < b  1. In our analysis b is set equal to 1. However, it can be easily
shown that our main ndings hold for 0 < b < 1.
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Similar to conventional wisdom, Proposition 1 informs us that competition in prices is
more competitive than competition in quantities. In other words, Cournot competition yields
higher prices and lower output than Bertrand competition. In this case, under a regulated
two-part tari¤ pricing scheme based on the marginal cost of the upstream monopoly, the
downstream rms are less e¢ cient under Cournot competition. As a consequence, they
charge higher prices and they produce a smaller quantity than under Bertrand competi-
tion. According to Proposition 2, downstream prots are higher under Cournot than under
Bertrand competition. This is due to the fact that the negative impact of the aggressive-
ness of competition on prots dominates the higher xed fee charged in Cournots case.
Finally, Proposition 3 informs us that under a regulated two part-tari¤ regime, a market
with Bertrand competition is more e¢ cient than a market with Cournot competition. The
higher consumers surplus under Bertrand competition is enough to dominate the higher
upstream and downstream prots in the Cournot case (see Proposition 2) and hence total
welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. Overall, it turns out that in a regulated verti-
cally linked market with upstreammonopoly and trading with non-linear contracts, Bertrand
competition is more socially desirable than Cournot competition.
Given Propositions 1, 2 and 3, it turns out that two-tier industries in which the upstream
market is perfectly competitive (i.e., upstream marginal cost pricing) are to a major extent
equivalent with one-tier industries where Bertrand is more e¢ cient than Cournot competi-
tion. In this respect the xed fee charged by the upstream monopolist does not a¤ect the
driving force (see next subsection) of our ndings.
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3.2 Deregulated monopoly
Alipranti et al. (2014) showed that the main results of subsection 3.1 are reversed when the
upstream monopoly is deregulated (by a marginal cost based two-part tari¤ pricing scheme)
and therefore is free to negotiate its wholesale prices. More specically, their ndings can be
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In a deregulated upstream monopoly trading via two-part tari¤s with two
downstream rivals, Cournot downstream competition is more e¢ cient (in the sense that it
is characterized by higher consumerssurplus and total welfare) than Bertrand downstream
competition.
The driving force of Alipranti et al. (2014) result is the so-called commitment problem
(see, among others, Hart & Tirole, 1990; Saggi & Vettas, 2002; Rey & Verge, 2004 and
de Fontenay & Gans, 2005). The commitment problem is generated by the fact that the
upstream monopoly negotiates via non-linear pricing with its downstream competing rivals
separately, not publicly. This in turns yields to an opportunistic behavior by the upstream
monopoly since the latter has the incentive to o¤er a lower wholesale price to Di than to
Dj. This will lead to an increase in the level of market share of Di and its protability
which will then be transferred upstream by the monopoly through a higher xed fee to Di.
It is worth emphasizing that the inability of the upstream monopoly to publicly commit to
specic contract terms to all downstream customers due to the existence of secret negoti-
ations between the two vertically linked segments of the market (i.e., upstream monopoly
and downstream oligopoly) prevents U from inducing the maximum overall industry prots
(Alipranti et al., 2014). In other words, the existence of the commitment problem will lead
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each Di, to an anticipated opportunistic behavior by its upstream monopoly supplier, and
thus an o¤er that maximizes the industrys overall prots would have to be turned down
(Rey & Verge; 2004, de Fontenay & Gans, 2005; Alipranti et al., 2014). It is argued that the
fact that competition in quantities is characterized by strategic substitutionality, whereas
competition in prices by strategic complementarity, intensies the opportunistic behavior of
the upstream monopolist in the former case, leading to lower wholesale prices which in turn
enable downstream rms to produce more e¢ ciently under Cournot than under Bertrand
competition (i.e., the commitment problem is more intense when downstream rms compete
in quantities). It can be easily noted that this di¤erence in the intensity of the commitment
problem between the two modes of downstream competition disappears under regulation due
to the xed (at the marginal cost level) wholesale prices set by the regulator. Therefore,
similar to Singh and Vives (1984), the competition is ercer under Bertrand than under
Cournot leading to Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
4 Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes under the two di¤erent regimes.
Alipranti et al. (2014) assume without loss of generality that marginal cost is zero
both upstream and downstream. The corresponding results with respect to the equilibrium
quantities and the total welfare in their context (where subscripts reg and wreg denote the
existence of regulated and deregulated upstream monopoly, respectively) under a non-zero
marginal cost c for the upstream monopolist are
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qCwreg =
(a  c)(2  )
2(2  2) (18)
qBwreg =
(a  c)(2 + )
4(1 + )
(19)
TWCwreg =
(a  c)2(2  )(6     32)
4(2  2)2 (20)
TWBwreg =
(a  c)2(2 + )(6  )
16(1 + )
(21)
Proposition 5. It is e¢ cient to regulate (deregulate) an upstream natural monopoly via
a marginal cost-based two-part tari¤ if the downstream competition takes place in prices
(quantities).
Proof. Given that consumerssurplus is equal to (1 + ) times the square of the equilib-
rium quantity, if qBreg > q
C
wreg and q
B
wreg > q
C
reg, then CS
B
reg > CS
C
wreg > CS
B
wreg > CS
C
reg
(qCwreg > q
B
wreg has been proven by Alipranti et al. (2014)). This is true since q
B
reg   qCwreg =
(a c)2(1 )
2(1+)(2 )(2 2) > 0 and q
B
wreg   qCreg = (a c)
2
4(1+)(2+)
> 0. Similarly, if TWBreg > TW
C
wreg and
TWBwreg > TW
C
reg, then TW
B
reg > TW
C
wreg > TW
B
wreg > TW
C
reg (TW
C
wreg > TW
B
wreg has been
proven by Alipranti et al. (2014)). This is true since TWBreg TWCwreg = (a c)
22(8 32)(1 )2
4(1+)(2 )2(2 2)2 >
0 and TWBwreg   TWCreg = (a c)
22(8 2)
16(1+)(2+)2
> 0
Proposition 5 is illustrated in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
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Table 1 illustrates our ndings for di¤erent values of . The second (third) and the
fourth (fth) columns illustrate the case of downstream Cournot (Bertrand) competition
under regulated and deregulated upstream monopoly , respectively. We assume the following
functional forms and parameter values: a = 1,  = 0:6 and c = 0:08 [The value of  is
approximated based on Draganska et al. (2010), while the value of c is based on Davis &
Muehlegger (2010)]. The values of  are those used by Correa-López (2007). In general,
parameter values were chosen so as to generate realistic results.
Our ndings have important implications for the type of policies imposed by the National
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) on natural monopolies such as network industries (electricity,
natural gas distribution segments, telecommunications networks, etc.). We argue that when
downstream Bertrand competition is present, by applying a non-linear pricing mechanism
leading to a marginal price equal to marginal cost, the NRAs increase the level of production
and eliminate the deadweight loss associated with the existence of the (upstream) monopoly.
In such cases (e.g., commercial and residential customers of natural gas) the NRAs can
e¢ ciently allow the monopolist to recoup its xed costs by charging xed fees that do not
depend on the level of production (Davis & Muehlegger, 2010). On the other hand, when
downstream Cournot competition is present (e.g., industrial customers of natural gas) and
customers are paying both a xed monthly fee and a price per unit equal to marginal cost
of the upstream monopoly, our ndings reveal that a two-part tari¤ pricing scheme leads
to signicant welfare loss. In other words, in the imposition of a two-part tari¤ marginal
cost pricing scheme, the regulatory authorities should indeed take into account the nature
of downstream competition. Our results indicate that the NRAs should be skeptical on the
type of regulation in the two-tier industries. Similarly, they indicate that it is important
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in the evaluation of an e¤ective regulatory scheme that the downstream rivals compete in
prices rather than quantities because otherwise di¤erent policy implications could be drawn.
5 Linear pricing
To further check for the robustness of our ndings, we consider the case where the upstream
monopolist trades with the downstream rms via linear contracts. By dropping F (the xed
tari¤) and conducting the same analysis as above, we get the following equations:
CSClwreg =
(1 + )(2  )2(a  c)2
4(2 + )2
(22)
TWClwreg = CS
C
lwreg 
(1 + ) + 2(3 + )
1 + 
(23)
CSBlwreg =
(a  c)2[3(1  )(1  )  2( + ) + (1  ) + 4]2
(1 + )(2  )2[3(1  )(1  )  2(1 + ) + 4]2 (24)
TWBlwreg = CS
B
lwreg  A (25)
CSClreg = (1 + )

a  c
2 + 
2
(26)
TWClreg = (a  c)2
(3 + )
(2 + )2
(27)
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CSBlreg = (1 + )

a  c
(1 + )(2  )
2
(28)
TWBlreg =
(a  c)2(3  2)
(1 + )(2  )2 (29)
where A = [3(1 )(1 ) 2(+)+(1 )+4][12+2 (14+) (7 4)2+(3+
)3+(1 )4(2 5)] and subscripts lreg and lwreg denote the existence and the absence
of regulation in the upstream monopoly, respectively. It can be easily shown that 26-29 are
equivalent to those generated in the case of non-linear marginal cost pricing (section 3.1).
Given this result and by performing tedious calculations, we get CSBlreg = CS
B
reg > CS
C
lreg =
CSCreg, CS
B
lreg > CS
B
lwreg > CS
C
lwreg, CS
C
lreg > CS
C
lwreg, TW
B
lreg = TW
B
reg > TW
C
lreg = TW
B
reg,
TWBlreg > TW
B
lwreg > TW
C
lwreg and TW
C
lreg > TW
C
lwreg. Figures 1-6 illustrate the validity of
the previous inequalities.4 Moreover from the aforementioned inequalities and the discussion
in section 4, it follows that CSCwreg > CS
C
lwreg and TW
C
wreg > TW
C
lwreg.
[Figures 1 to 6 about here]
The absence of the xed fee in the case where trading occurs via linear contracts, elim-
inates the commitment problem and leads to results consistent with conventional wisdom
(Bertrand competition is more e¢ cient than Cournot competition).
Furthermore, the level of consumerssurplus and total welfare remain unchanged under
marginal cost pricing regardless of the type of the tari¤ charged by the upstream monopoly
(i.e., linear or non-linear). More specically, when trading occurs via linear contracts, the
4We use gures instead of algebraic expressions for reader-friendly purposes.
16
xed tari¤ representing the prots of the monopoly under non-linear tari¤s is distributed to
the downstream rms. However, this change does not alter the nal results.
In conclusion, the dilemma of regulation presented in section 4 does not exist under linear
contracts; e¢ ciency dictates regulation of the upstream monopoly regardless of the type of
the downstream competition.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate whether the decision of regulating or deregulating an upstream
monopoly is based on the nature of the downstream competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand).
To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream
regulated monopoly is trading via two-part tari¤ contracts with a downstream duopoly. Our
ndings indicate that the nature of downstream competition in vertically linked markets with
an upstream natural monopoly constitutes an important signal for the regulator. We show
that monopoly regulation consisting of a non-linear marginal cost based pricing scheme is
e¢ cient under downstream Bertrand competition and ine¢ cient under downstream Cournot
competition. Our ndings suggest that the regulatory authoritiesdecisions of whether or
not they should regulate a market with upstream natural monopoly characteristics should
depend, among other things, on the nature of downstream competition. We have to stress
however, that the aforementioned results are not necessarily robust to alternative assump-
tions regarding the upstream market structure and/or the contracting procedure/contract
type. For example when the upstream monopolist trades with downstream rms via linear
contracts then the type of the downstream competition does not a¤ect the decisions of the
17
regulator. This implies that the results regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand
competition depend on the specic features of the vertically linked markets. Furthermore,
the important policy implications of our results call for further investigation through empir-
ical research.
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Table 1: Nature of downstream competition and regulation
Regulation Deregulation
Cournot Bertrand Cournot Bertrand
 = 0:3
CS 0:208 0:225 0:218 0:215
TW 0:528 0:541 0:535 0:533
 = 0:5
CS 0:203 0:251 0:233 0:220
TW 0:474 0:502 0:492 0:485
 = 0:8
CS 0:194 0:327 0:297 0:230
TW 0:410 0:457 0:450 0:428
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Figure 1: Consumers’ surplus – Bertrand vs. Cournot downstream competition 
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Figure 2: Total welfare – Bertrand vs. Cournot downstream competition 
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Figure 3: Consumers’ surplus – Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly 
with Bertrand downstream competition. 
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Figure 4: Total welfare – Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly with 
Bertrand downstream competition. 
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Figure 5: Consumers’ surplus – Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly 
with Cournot downstream competition. 
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Figure 6: Total welfare – Regulated vs. deregulated upstream monopoly with 
Cournot downstream competition. 
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